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South Korea has strong laws and practice in criminal 
defamation and insult, which have affected the creation of equally 
strong criminal laws and practice in candidate defamation and 
candidate insult law.  Many defamation cases were filed to protect 
the reputation of public officials, while practically all of the 
candidate defamation and insult indictments are aimed at protecting 
the reputation of the candidates for public office.  Such a trend has 
been found at odds with an international human rights standard on 
freedom of speech that has consistently warned against the anti-
democratic potentials of criminal defamation and insult laws.  In this 
Article, the authors engage in an empirical study of South Korean 
criminal prosecutions for candidate defamation and candidate insult, 
respectively, to test a postulate underlying human rights standards, 
namely that criminal defamation law has been abused for political 
purposes, as the renowned Leflar study has shown in the U.S. context 
half a century ago, giving rise to such cases as New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two hundred years before John Milton published 
Areopagitica (1644), the first explicit tract on freedom of speech, 
King Sejong the Great of the Chosun Dynasty was famous for 
refusing to punish people arrested for seditious remarks.  For instance, 
in 1433, when a debtor falling behind on repayments of a government 
loan was brought to him for openly complaining that “[t]his King’s 
throne will not last long.  A new king will rise from the Western 
Province,” King Sejong said “people are bound to blame others when 
things don’t turn out the way they want. . . . Likewise, he is just 
blaming me for his hardship.  There is no harm done to me” and 
refused to punish him.1  Indeed, as early as 1428, Sejong had already 
issued a judgment that “no one should be punished for criticizing 
government” on the case of a person who called his throne “the Dark 
Age.”2  Often he implored to his ministers, “I am neither virtuous, nor 
skillful in administration.  Some of my acts will surely contravene 
Heaven’s wills.  You should look hard for my shortcomings and 
thereby help me reflect on and act rightfully on Heaven’s lessons.”3  
He even scolded the ministers calling for austerity: “You want me to 
punish the people just for speaking their minds truthfully about me? 
Are you trying to push me into blind ignorance by keeping me from 
hearing from down under about the real conditions?”4  His throne was 
                                                                                                                    
 1 SEJONG JANGHEON DAEWANG SILLOK [VERITABLE RECORDS OF KING SEJONG] bk. 18, 
vol. 59, at 45 [hereinafter SEJONG SILLOK], http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kda_11503013_002 
[http://perma.cc/P9BN-AP8M] (statements on Mar. 13, 1433). 
 2 SEJONG SILLOK bk. 13, vol. 40, at 4, http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kda_11004021_002 
[http://perma.cc/GXD9-F2XW] (statements on Apr. 21, 1428). 
 3 SEJONG SILLOK bk. 10, vol. 30, at 21, http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kda_10712008_
001 [http://perma.cc/22PS-TSGZ] (statements on Dec. 8, 1425). 
 4 SEJONG SILLOK bk. 19, vol. 61, at 19, http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kda_11507027_
001 [http://perma.cc/5R4G-CRAW] (statements on July 27, 1433). 
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in a way representative of Chosun Dynasty’s attitudes toward the 
relationship between free speech and good government: every king’s 
remark in court was recorded verbatim by official recorders who were 
guaranteed independence and confidentiality and, most importantly, 
published the records for the eyes of all so that people of the next 
generation could use them to monitor and criticize the previous king’s 
performance on the basis of the records not adulterated in any way by 
the kings.  Regardless of what little freedom of speech commoners 
enjoyed, the ruling elite attempted to maintain a healthy dialogue 
between information and governance. 
Unfortunately, despite this head start and even after 
modernization and the adoption of the more “advanced” Western 
system, freedom of speech in Korea seems to be on shaky ground,5 
especially because of the very laws constitutive of the Western 
system, such as criminal defamation, insult, and “truth defamation.”  
While most of these laws were abolished, became obsolete, or were 
“tamed” in their countries of origin 6  over time, their Korean 
counterparts 7  are still being vigorously enforced in modern-day 
Korea, as shown below.  The epitome of the instability was the 
prosecution of the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shinbun correspondent 
                                                                                                                    
 5 FREEDOM HOUSE, South Korea, in FREEDOM ON THE NET 2012: A GLOBAL 
ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA 456 (Sanja Kelly et al. eds., 2012). 
 6 Richard N. Winfield & Kristin Mendoza, The Abolition Movement: Decriminalizing 
Defamation and Insult Laws, 25 COMM. LAW., Fall 2007, at 7, 7–9. 
 7 Hyeongbeop [Criminal Act], Act No. 293, Sept. 18, 1953, amended by Act. No. 5057, 
Dec. 29, 1995, art. 310 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online 
database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawPrint.do?hseq=28627 [http://perma.cc/
W4S9-X7ZU] (“If the facts alleged under Article 307 (1) are true and solely for the public 
interest, the act shall not be punishable.”) [hereinafter Criminal Act];  
 
(1) A person who defames another by publicly alleging facts shall be 
punished by imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not 
more than two years or by a fine not exceeding five million won . . . .(2) 
A person who defames another by publicly alleging false facts shall be 
punished by imprisonment for not more than five years, suspension of 
qualifications for not more than ten years, or a fine not exceeding ten 
million won. 
 
Id. art. 307, translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online database (alteration in 
original), https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawPrint.do?hseq=28627 [http://perma.cc/
6GSS-LDZE]; Id. art. 311, translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online 
database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawPrint.do?hseq=28627 [http://perma.cc/
6GSS-LDZE] (“A person who publicly insults another shall be punished by imprisonment 
or imprisonment without prison labor for not more than one year or by a fine not exceeding 
two million won.”). 
3
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for defaming Korea’s president, which fortunately ended in a not-
guilty verdict.8 
These laws also gave rise to parallels in election regulation, 
such as crimes of “candidate slander”9 and “false election speech.”10  
It should be noted that although “false election speech” covers both 
false self-aggrandizement by the candidates themselves and false 
accusations against other candidates, as this study reveals that most 
indicted cases involved the latter.  So instead, we will call it 
“candidate defamation.”  Also, “candidate slander” punishes 
spreading facts about a candidate but the prosecutors and courts are 
using it as a “candidate insult” law whereby hateful epithets against 
candidates are punished.  Hence, we will call it “candidate insult.” 
A strong impetus for “taming” or otherwise containing 
criminal defamation laws came from a 1954 U.S. study done by 
Robert Leflar who found that nearly half the defamation prosecutions 
between 1920s and 1956 were political in nature, i.e., incumbents 
with influence over prosecutors attempted to suppress opposition 
                                                                                                                    
 8 Choe Sang-hun, Court Acquits Journalist Accused of Defaming South Korean 
President, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/world/asia/
south-korea-park-geun-hye-defamation-verdict.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/U2ZX-TBUB]. 
 9  
Any person who slanders a candidate (including a person who intends 
to be a candidate), his/her spouse, lineal ascendants or descendants, 
siblings by pointing out any fact openly through a speech, broadcast, 
newspaper, communication, magazine, poster, propaganda document, or 
other means, with the intention of getting elected, or getting another 
person to be or not to be elected, shall be punished by imprisonment with 
prison labor for not more than three years or by a fine not exceeding five 
million won: Provided, That where it is a true fact and concerns a public 
interest, he/she shall not be punished. 
 
Gongjikseongeobeop [Public Official Election Act], Act No. 7681, Aug. 4, 2005, as 
amended, art. 251 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online 
database (emphasis added), http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=35856&
lang=ENG [http://perma.cc/TF3W-APVU] [hereinafter Public Official Election Act]. 
 10  
(2) Any person who publishes, or makes another person publish, any 
false facts on a candidate, his/her spouse, lineal ascendants or 
descendants, or siblings, so as to be unfavorable to the candidate . . . , 
with the intention of stopping the candidate from being elected, or 
persons who possess a propaganda document in which a false fact is 
entered with the intention of distributing it, shall be punished by 
imprisonment with prison labor for not more than seven years or by a 
fine of not less than five million won nor more than 30 million won. 
 
Id. art. 250. 
4
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candidates. 11   The study influenced the Supreme Court’s 
deliberations on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan12 and Garrison v. 
Louisiana 13  a year later—the two pillars that established the 
relationship between democracy and modern defamation laws by 
making it very difficult for public officials either to become a plaintiff 
in civil court or influence prosecutors into suppressing their criticism.  
A similar empirical study was done about half a century later and 
reconfirmed Leflar’s earlier findings.14 
This paper attempts a similar empirical study of the current 
candidate defamation and insult prosecutions in South Korea between 
2005 and 2015.  This study tests the postulate that criminal 
defamation law is indeed subject to political abuse by the incumbents 
through their control over prosecutors.  In Part I, the paper surveys 
Korean law and practice in criminal defamation and positions it in 
international comparison.  In Part II, the paper surveys Korean 
candidate defamation/insult laws and compares them against selected 
countries.  In Part III, the methods and findings of the empirical 
analysis are presented. 
II. CRIMINAL DEFAMATION PROSECUTION IN KOREA: 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
1. Volume and Nature of Criminal Defamation 
In Korea, private persons are vigorously subjected to criminal 
prosecution for defamation, often in defense of public officials’ 
reputation.15  According to the non-profit organization Article 19, 
during a twenty-month period between January 1, 2005 and August 
                                                                                                                    
 11 Robert A. Leflar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 TEX. L. 
REV. 984, 985 (1956). 
 12 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 13 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
 14 Russell Hickey, A Compendium of U.S. Criminal Libel Prosecutions: 1990–2002, 
LIBEL DEF. RESOURCE CTR. BULL., Mar. 2002, at 97. 
 15 See Stephan Haggard & Jong-sung You, Freedom of Expression in South Korea, 45 
J. CONTEMP. ASIA 167 (2015); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank 
La Rue, on His Mission to the Republic of Korea (6–17 May 2010), ¶ 89, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/27/Add.2 (Mar. 21, 2011), https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5006597.04208
374.html [https://perma.cc/XV2U-HFZ4] (recommending the removal of defamation as a 
criminal offense from the Criminal Act). 
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2007, only 146 people have been incarcerated for defamation,16 not 
including Korea, where according to the congressional disclosure 
made by the Supreme Court, 136 people were incarcerated over a 
fifty-five month period between January 1, 2005 through July 2009.17    
This suggests that Korea took up close to 30% of all people 
incarcerated in the relevant periods.  This is in stark contrast to the 
fact that most developed countries have abolished (or engaged in the 
process of abolishing) criminal prosecution for defamation,18 due to 
a concern that the incumbent government or other powerful 
individuals might influence prosecutors to suppress their opposition 
or critics—that is, using the taxpayers’ money for political purposes 
under the pretext of defamation prosecution.19  For instance, Japan 
retains criminal defamation20 on the books but uses imprisonment as 
punishment sparingly (one to four cases annually, according to the 
Article 19 statistics).  Germany is the exception,21 but most of that 
country’s convictions for criminal defamation and insult represent 
fines with almost no actual incarcerations while the substantial 
number of actual incarcerations in Korea are many times longer than 
six months. 
The trend continues to date and with greater intensity.  For 
instance, in 2011, 3,340 people were tried for criminal defamation 
                                                                                                                    
 16 See Advocacy: Defamation Map, ARTICLE 19 (2007), http://www.article19.org/
advocacy/defamationmap/overview.html (no longer available; last visited May 30, 2009) 
(alternatively available at https://web.archive.org/web/20080124075739/http://www.
article19.org/advocacy/defamationmap/overview.html) [https://perma.cc/6RXU-4D9W]. 
 17 Jung Jae Ho, Yichunsuk “Myungyehwesonbupjoe, 2-Nyeonsae 46% Jeungga” [MP 
Lee Chun-Seok, “46% Rise in Defamation Crimes in 2 Years”], DAUM NEWS (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://v.media.daum.net/v/20101006161113668 [http://perma.cc/MG4S-PP9Q]. 
 18 See Winfield & Mendoza, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining that “various international 
organizations and authorities” have criticized and attacked criminal defamation laws “as 
violating the rights of free press and the rights of people to receive news and information.”); 
CONFERENCE REPORT, ORG. FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, LIBEL AND INSULT 
LAWS: WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE TO DECRIMINALIZE LIBEL AND REPEAL INSULT LAWS?, 
www.osce.org/item/3544.html (alternatively available at https://web.archive.org/web/2009
1005111908/http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2003/11/3346_en.pdf) [https://perma.cc/
LZ86-VUQE]. 
 19 Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American 
Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433, 477 (2004). 
 20 KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [Pen. C.], Law No. 45 of 1907, art. 230 (Japan), http://www.japanese
lawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1960&vm=04&re=02 [https://perma.cc/N3HZ-LWMR]. 
 21 International Press Institute, IPI Special Investigation: The Application of Criminal 
Defamation Laws in Europe, MEDIALAWS DATABASE (Sept. 15, 2015), http://legaldb.
freemedia.at/2015/09/15/ipi-special-investigation-the-application-of-criminal-defamation-
laws-in-europe/ [http://perma.cc/NY5X-7J7E]. 
6
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and forty-seven were actually incarcerated (this is a conservative 
estimate, since the number does not include sixty-three who received 
deferred sentences).22  In 2010, a total of 2,193 people were indicted 
for defamation, out of which forty-three incarcerations for 
defamation resulted. 
As U.N. Special Rapporteur of Freedom of Expression and 
Opinion Frank La Rue pointed out in his report on Korea, many of 
these criminal prosecutions are cases where private persons are 
subjected to criminal prosecution for defamation in defense of public 
officials’ reputation.23  The political nature of these prosecutions is 
evinced by the fact that most cases resulted in withdrawal, dismissal, 
or not-guilty judgments, leaving only indelible chilling effects on the 
populace.24 
Famously, in March 2009, six television documentary 
producers of PD’s Notebook were prosecuted for producing and 
broadcasting an investigative piece on the danger of mad cow disease 
associated with American beef. 25   The prosecutors charged that 
                                                                                                                    
 22 2012 SABEOB YEONGAM [2012 LEGAL YEAR BOOK], ch. 5, 876 (2012), 
http://file.scourt.go.kr//AttachDownload?path=001&seqnum=66&gubun=10&file=144411
4039639_154719.pdf&downFile=05_2012%B3%E2_%C7%FC%BB%E7_%C0%CE%B
D%C5%BA%B8%C8%A3.pdf [http://perma.cc/G7EB-W839]. 
 23 U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 15, ¶¶ 25, 89. 
 24 PEOPLE’S SOLIDARITY FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY [PSPD], PAK GEON-HYE 
CHEONGBU UI KUNGMIN IBMAGEUM SARYE ISIP-I SEON [THE 22 CASES OF THE 
GOVERNMENT’S STRATEGIC PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND 
EXPRESSION] (2015), http://www.peoplepower21.org/?module=file&act=procFileDown
load&file_srl=1359076&sid=0dbc93fdbe92d151cc555e52838b188f&module_srl=505220 
[http://perma.cc/DV95-4LEK]. 
 25 PD Notebook: Gingeupchwijae, Miguksan Soegogi, Gwanyeon 
Gwangoobyeongaeseo Anjeonhanga? (television broadcast Apr. 29, 2008); PD Notebook: 
Miguksan Soegogi, Gwanyeon Gwangoobyeongaeseo Anjeonhanga? (television broadcast 
May 13, 2008).  On June 20, 2008, the producers of a television documentary PD Notebook 
were accused of defamation by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery for 
producing and having broadcast a special episode on mad cow disease and its occurrence in 
the U.S. beef on April 30, 2008. PD Notebook is a popular weekly documentary by MBC, 
one of the three premier broadcasting stations. The theory was that the documentary 
exaggerated the susceptibility of U.S. beef to mad cow diseases, thereby derogating the 
reputation of the agricultural minister who had decided to import U.S. beef. 
  The prosecutors accepted the accusation by the agricultural minister and announced 
on July 29, 2008 that the PD Notebook episode includes “19 different distortions.” PD 
Sucheop 19 Got Uidojeok Waegok [Intentional Distortion of 19 PD Notebooks] http://news.
chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/07/30/2008073000061.html [https://perma.cc/5BVH-
B6VJ].  One such distortion is as follows: the mother of a human mad cow disease victim in 
the televised interview uttered in English the similar sounding name of another disease as 
the reason for her daughter’s death but the Korean subtitle said ‘a mad cow disease.’  The 
producers changed the Korean translation because the mother used the names of the two 
7
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defaming the American beef actually defamed the agricultural 
minister who found the cows appropriate for import into the 
country.  The producers were found not guilty through all three stages 
of the court.26    But the fact of the prosecution alone chilled all other 
                                                                                                                    
diseases interchangeably in previous conversations and there were ample circumstances to 
believe that the mother meant ‘mad cow disease.’  Even so, the prosecutors appear to believe, 
the mother’s mistake should not have been corrected by the producers to augment the 
emotional value of the mother’s interview.  Another alleged distortion is the comparison of 
Koreans’ genetic susceptibility to mad cow disease to other races, which shows Koreans to 
be three times more susceptible.  The prosecutors claim that the comparison left out other 
relevant factors. In general, the prosecutors’ investigations reveal at most sensationalizing 
and editorializing of the data but not outright falsities.   
  On December 29, 2008, the prosecutor in charge of the PD Notebook case resigned 
for an unknown reason.  It has been rumored that he has disagreed with the top leaders of 
the Prosecutors’ Office and has refused to indict the producers for the reason that PD 
Notebook constitutes criticism of a government policy and therefore cannot be punished for 
defamation of government officials in accordance with freedom of speech. In the end, the 
case resulted in not-guilty verdict at the Supreme Court.  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
2010Do17237, Sept. 2, 2011 (S. Kor.) 
 26 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do17237, Sept. 2, 2011 (S. Kor.) (author translation). 
The Court spoke on the lack of the requisite malice as follows: 
 
In media defamation cases, the standard of review varies depending on 
whether the supposed victim of the media report is a public figure or a 
private figure, whether the report concerns matters of public interest or 
matters of purely private domain, or whether the report, seen objectively, 
concerns matters of public and social nature that people must know and 
therefore contributes to the formation of public opinion or open 
discussion, etc. As to the speeches belonging to private domain, 
protection of reputation may prevail over freedom of press. As to the 
matters of public and social nature, the restriction on freedom of press 
must be eased (See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 97Hun-Ma265, 
June. 24, 1999 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da37524 & 37531, 
Jan. 22, 2002 (S. Kor.)). Especially, matters concerning the 
government’s or state agencies’ policy making or performance of their 
duties must be subject to people’s constant monitoring and critique, 
which can be properly conducted only if the freedom is sufficiently 
guaranteed to the press whose main duties are such monitoring and 
critiquing. The government or state agencies cannot be deemed the 
victims of criminal defamation, and therefore, even if a media report 
mainly concerning the government’s or state agencies’ policy-making 
or work performance reduces the social reputation of the official 
involved in such policy-making or work, such report cannot be held to 
defame the official unless such report is malicious or a very rash attack 
against the official as an individual (Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
2002Da62494, July 22, 2003; Supreme Court [S. Ct.] 2004Da35199, 
May 12, 2006, (S. Kor.)). 
The lower court found some part of the defendant’s media report to be a 
false proposition incongruent with objective facts but ruled against 
attributing the crime of defamation to the defendants for the following 
8
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broadcasters and television producers into silence for close to five 
years since then and to date.  No longer do we see many television 
programs healthily critiquing government policies.  Especially 
chilling about the logic of the indictment was that, even a report on 
consumer products could be closely inspected for any error or 
inaccuracy by prosecutors to see if such errors or inaccuracies might 
somehow affect the reputation of government officials who had 
commended such products. 
In 2009, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon filed a charge against, and 
prosecutors indicted, the merchants leasing store space from the city 
for demonstrating against and criticizing the city’s new lease policies 
allegedly favoring big businesses. 27   In 2009, the National Tax 
Services filed a charge against, and prosecutors indicted, one of its 
employees for revealing a political scandal of its Director.28  These 
two cases also resulted in acquittals up through the Supreme Court. 
Additionally, in 2010, Shin Sang-chul, the operator of online 
media Surprise, was indicted for alleging that the government 
investigation into the sinking of ROKS Corvette Cheonan was a 
cover-up,29 and his trial is ongoing.  In April 2014, Hong Ga-hye, a 
                                                                                                                    
reasons: the overall intent and content of the report is to point out the 
problems with American beef’s food safety and the government’s beef 
trade negotiation and to criticize the Korean government for rushing to 
conclude the negotiation without review of sufficient time.  Considering 
that the report concerns the matters of public and social nature 
contributing to the opinion-making and open discussion on the 
government policies on national food stocks, the standard of finding 
defamation should be different from the one applicable to the matter of 
private nature.  The part of the report found to be false is about American 
beef’s communicability of mad cow disease and therefore is not directly 
related to the official’s reputation.  Neither can it be viewed as malicious 
or an attack prominently lacking substance against the supposed victim. 
Under these circumstances, the defendants cannot be attributed 
knowledge that they were defaming the victims and cannot be held to 
have the mens rea. 
We find the lower court’s decision proper . . . . 
 27 PSPD, CH’EONGWADAE DEUNG’E CHINAN ONYEONGAN KUNGMIN IBMAGEUM 
SOSONG HYEONHWANG POGOSEO MIT P’YEONJI CHEONDAL [REPORTS AND RESPONSE 
AGAINST THE BLUE HOUSE ON LAWSUITS SHUTTING PEOPLE UP THROUGHOUT THE LAST FIVE 
YEARS] (2013), http://www.peoplepower21.org/PSPD_press/1032358 [http://perma.cc/
FUH8-SF7J]. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Barbara Demick & John M. Glionna, Doubts Surface on North Korea’s Role in Ship 
Sinking, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/23/world/la-fg-
korea-torpedo-20100724 [http://perma.cc/YQ5R-U9T2]; see also You Jong-sung, The 
Cheonan Incident and the Declining Freedom of Expression in South Korea, 39 ASIAN 
9
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volunteer rescuer, was indicted for falsely accusing the government 
rescuers of the tragic Sewol ferry of incompetence and jailed for a 
little over 100 days before being found not guilty.  Her appellate trials 
are ongoing. 30   Then, in October 2014, a Sankei Shinbun 
correspondent was indicted for defamation for spreading people’s 
doubts about President Park’s whereabouts during the seven hours 
spanning the sinking of the tragic Sewol Ferry, and was later found 
not guilty.31 
Even without indictments, the mere charges of defamation 
filed by public officials add to the chilling effects.  In 2008, the Prime 
Minister’s Office filed a charge against Kim Jong-ik, who posted a 
video clip pejoratively parodying the then President Lee Myung-
bak,32 though the charge was deferred indefinitely by the prosecutors.  
In 2010, the Minister of Culture filed a charge of defamation against 
a netizen for posting a video clip of the Minister trying to hug the 
figure skating star Kim Yu-na, only to be shunned by her.33  That 
charge was also dropped by the prosecutors. 
Also, in 2012, the notorious National Intelligence Services 
(NIS)34 filed charges against three different groups of individuals 
(Pyo Chang-won, Nakkomsu members, Suh Young-Suk) for alleging 
that NIS secretly financed an online campaign supporting the 
conservative candidate Park Geun-Hye in the 2012 Presidential 
Election.35  While the prosecutors are still investigating those charges, 
some of the NIS officials were themselves actually indicted for 
                                                                                                                    
PERSPECTIVE, 195 (2015) (discussing the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and 
factors that might contribute to the erosion of press freedom in South Korea). 
 30 Korean Court Acquits Woman of Lying about Ferry Rescue, KOREA TIMES (Jan. 9, 
2015), http://www.koreatimesus.com/korean-court-acquits-woman-of-lying-about-ferry-
rescue/ [http://perma.cc/A7S4-NR6W]. 
 31 Japan Journalist Found Not Guilty of Defaming S Korean President , BBC (Dec. 17, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35118701 [http://perma.cc/W9W4-E3E6]. 
 32 The Prime Minister’s Office “Civilian Illegal Inspections,” KYUNGHANG SHINMUN 
(Mar. 3, 2012), http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=20120305030
0235 [https://perma.cc/Q8XE-TWW7]. 
 33 Kwon Mee-yoo, Culture Minister Yu Upset at Yu-na Video, KOREA TIMES (Mar. 17, 
2010), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/03/117_62548.html [http://
perma.cc/7D3B-XVT6]. 
 34 Red-Handed, ECONOMIST (Mar., 21, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
banyan/2014/03/south-korean-intelligence [http://perma.cc/PEF3-LBMR]. 
 35 PSPD, supra note 27. 
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actively conducting other more systematic and extensive online 
campaigns to manipulate public opinions.36 
The very use of criminal defamation has been condemned by 
international human rights bodies, including U.N. Human Rights 
Committee in its 2011 General Comment 34,37 for being abused by 
authoritarian rulers as pretexts for oppressing opponents, especially 
by misusing prosecutorial resources paid for by taxpayers.  The 
European Court of Human Rights has struck down almost all national 
courts’ criminal judgments against journalists who criticized the 
government or high officials, for being too excessive or not 
                                                                                                                    
 36  
National Assembly and presidential elections in 2012 were viewed as 
free and fair; however, during the year there was increasing evidence of 
broad efforts by government agencies to use social networking services 
to interfere in the elections in favor of candidates from the incumbent 
conservative party. Prosecutors indicted former NIS chief Won Sei-hoon 
for violating the NIS law and the Public Official Election Act, charging 
that the NIS agents tried to sway voter opinion through more than 22 
million postings on the internet, on Twitter, and on other social media 
sites. The indictment stated the NIS began online activities to influence 
politics in 2009, and interfered in the 2010 local elections and the 2011 
Seoul mayoral election. These activities were, however, outside the six-
month statute of limitations for the election law. Authorities indicted at 
least five other NIS officials on similar charges. Prosecutors indicted 
former Seoul Metropolitan Police Chief Kim Yong-pan on charges of 
violating the Police Officers Act and the Public Official Election Act for 
abusing his authority in hampering a police investigation into the NIS, 
which led to a police announcement three days before the presidential 
election that claimed NIS was clear of wrongdoing. 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/eap/220204.htm, [http://perma.cc/DJ5W-ZPX2]. 
 37 U.N. Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2BH7-ML84] (“States parties should consider the decriminalization of 
defamation and, in any case, the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced 
in the most serious of cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.”). 
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respecting people’s right to know.38  Of course, the strongest reaction 
came from the United States early in Garrison v. Louisiana.39 
2. Truth Defamation40 
Criminal prosecution in Korea also applies to truthful 
statements (or statements not proven to be false)—even in the 
absence of privacy concerns, in contravention to the Special 
Rapporteur’s 41  and U.N. Human Rights Committee’s 42  specific 
                                                                                                                    
 38 See Lyashko v. Ukraine, App. No. 21040/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76714 [http://perma.cc/QU7P-Y5MH] (regarding a 
reporter criticizing the Prime Minister); Scharsach v. Austria, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2003-XI.pdf [http://perma.cc/C7M8-
JEWS] (regarding a reporter calling a far-right politician “closet Nazi,” fine overturned); 
Colombani v. Fr., 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60532 
[http://perma.cc/8PQL-Y4H3] (regarding a reporter scorning Moroccan government’s drug 
combat policy); Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
271, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2002-I.pdf [http://perma.cc/
HH8H-3TMH] (regarding a reporter comparing an Austrian politician’s immigration policy 
to that of Nazi’s); Dalban v. Rom., 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 221, http://www.echr.
coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_1999-VI.pdf [http://perma.cc/44VB-V49A] (regarding 
a reporter revealing a public agency’s corruptions); Nilsen v. Nor, 1999-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
57, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_1999-VIII.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8UPW-U8MH]; De Haes v. Belg., App. No. 19983/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58015 [http://perma.cc/6RD2-TSMD] (regarding a critique of a 
judge’s divorce judgment); Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), App. No. 20834/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58044 [http://perma.cc/TUP2-RN8J] 
(regarding a reporter calling a conservative politician “a fool”); Castells v. Spain, App. No. 
11798/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57772 [http://perma.cc/
U9WJ-Y3SX] (regarding a report on murder in 1977 Basque); Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Ice., 
App. No. 13778/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57795 
[http://perma.cc/JUE5-Y7VF]; Barfod v. Den., App. No. 11508/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57430 [http://perma.cc/X5SM-M3YN]; Lingens v. 
Austria, App. No. 9815/82, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1986), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57523 
[http://perma.cc/8SAD-PFUS] (regarding a reporter criticizing former Austrian Prime 
Minister “opportunistic” and “immoral”).  See also Dan Kozlowski, “For the Protection of 
the Reputation or Rights of Others”: The European Court of Human Rights’ Interpretation 
of the Defamation Exception in Article 10(2), 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 133 (2006). 
 39 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
 40 Criminal Act, supra note 7 art. 307(1). 
 41 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, on His 
Mission to Italy (11–18 November 2013), ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/30/Add.3 (Apr. 29, 
2014) (“The Special Rapporteur reiterated that for a statement to be considered defamatory, 
it must be false, it must injure another person’s reputation and it must be made with malicious 
intent to cause injury to another individual’s reputation.”). 
 42 U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 37, (alteration in original) (“All . . . penal 
defamation laws . . . should include such defences as the defence of truth . . . .”). Upon 
interview of the members of the Human Rights Committee on October 15, 2016, the 
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mandates to exempt such statements.  Defendants can only escape 
liability by proving that the statements were made solely for public 
interest, a burden of proof that is difficult to sustain 43 unless the 
speaker is from a media organization.  For instance, the Supreme 
Court refused the public interest defense of a worker making a 
truthful statement about his employer’s non-payment of his wages on 
the grounds that the worker intended to pressure the employer into 
paying his wages, i.e., the public interest was not his sole motive.44  
The same reasoning probably explains the Court’s decision 
convicting a drug wholesaler who truthfully complained about the 
pharmaceutical companies’ unfair trade practices. 45  The practical 
effect of this truth defamation is that an individual who has 
encountered corruption in the government or other powerful entities 
cannot freely share her knowledge with others for fear that she may 
not be able to sustain the burden of proving that the “public interest” 
was her “sole motive.” 
In a suicide of a celebrity actress who left behind a document 
that reveals corruption involving sexual briberies and sexual 
coercions in the entertainment and media industry and enumerates as 
the main culprits certain powerful individuals, almost no major media 
agencies reported the real names of the people listed, although it was 
clear to many that such whistleblowing would be certainly in the 
public interest.46 
Criminal prosecution of truthful statements has allowed, for 
instance, the overreaching interpretation by the Korean 
Communication Standards Commission (“KCSC”) against the Daum 
Agora petition page, which only restated Governor Kim Moon-soo’s 
own allegedly unpatriotic words and added at the end the petitioner’s 
own negative evaluation of Kim’s statements. 47   Again, such 
                                                                                                                    
members, though wishing not to be named, agreed that the defense of truth must be effective 
without any other condition such as “public interest.” 
 43 Criminal Act, supra note 7, art. 310. 
 44 Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2004Do3912, Oct. 15, 2004 (S.Kor.). 
 45 Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2004Do1497, May 28, 2004 (S.Kor.). 
 46 Justin McCurry, Storm in South Korea over Jang Ja-yeon’s Suicide, GUARDIAN (Mar. 
31, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/01/south-korea-entertaiment-jang-
jayeon [http://perma.cc/VH7Z-NZMK]. 
 47 On January 2, 2009, Governor Kim Moon-soo during a public speech asked 
rhetorically, “Would today’s Korea have been possible had she not gone through the 
Japanese colonial period, the division, and the war?”  A public uproar followed , criticizing 
Governor Kim for rationalizing the nation’s tragedies.  One individual started an online 
petition on a Daum Agora site, where Governor Kim’s remarks, quoted word-for-word, were 
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discussion of a high official’s historical position would have qualified 
as spoken “solely for the public interest.” 
Countries such as Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, 
and Switzerland48 retain truth defamation law, which requires public 
interest as an element of defense.  However, they apply it to 
disclosure of private facts, not to protect a malfeasor from 
reputational loss.  In Korea, truth defamation law is actually used by 
a malfeasor to prevent people from talking about his or her 
malfeasance.  For instance, a member of an elders association was 
found guilty of truth defamation when he alerted other members 
about violent behavior that the association’s officer exhibited toward 
other members with no intention of keeping it private.49  In fact, the 
officer’s companion was found guilty of battery for her conduct 
during the violent encounter. 
How Sullivan has been embraced by Korean courts has been 
masterfully documented by Professor Youm Kyu Ho.50  However, as 
he himself admits, adoption of the Sullivan-like rule has not resulted 
in a judicial battleground favorable for media organizations.51  One 
of the reasons is that truth defamation has silently distorted the burden 
of proof in favor of the prosecutor/plaintiff in “falsity defamation” 
cases, the staple of defamation litigation around the world: if one will 
be held liable regardless of the veracity of the statement, judges have 
                                                                                                                    
followed by criticism, such as “nation-destroying remarks” and a plea for resignation.   Other 
netizens could express their agreement or disagreement with the plea for resignation by 
posting replies on the page.  KCSC censored the petition page for “defamation,” 
contradicting even established principles.  A principle that expression of mere opinions 
cannot be imposed any legal liability has been firmly established and several times 
reconfirmed by the highest courts of the country.  So has been the principle that a true 
statement made solely for public interest (e.g., a statement challenging the qualification of a 
public official) cannot be held legally liable.  Park Kyung-Sin, The “Sin of Truth 
Propagation” and Governor Kim Moon-su, HANKYOREH (Feb. 8, 2009), http://www.hani.
co.kr/arti/opinion/column/337639.html [https://perma.cc/J4AA-F8QR]. 
 48 Legal Provisions Concerning Defamation, Libel and Insult , in DEFAMATION AND 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 51 (Council of Eur. 2003), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublic
CommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680483b2d#search
=%22Legal%20Provisions%20Concerning%20Defamation%22 [http://perma.cc/W7PK-
268R]. 
 49 Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2012Do11914, Mar. 28, 2013 (S. Kor.).  See also Incheon 
District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2012Go-Dan374, May 30, 2012 (S. Kor.); Incheon District Court 
[Dist. Ct.], 2012No1630, Sept. 21, 2012 (S. Kor.).  
 50 Kyu Ho Youm, The “Actual Malice” of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: A Free 
Speech Touchstone in a Global Century, 19 COMM. L. & POL’Y. 185, 201–03 (2014). 
 51 Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Law and the Press: U.S. and South Korea Compared, 13 UCLA 
PAC. BASIN L. J. 231, 262–63 (1995). 
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little incentive to strictly impose the plaintiffs’ or prosecutors’ burden 
of proving the falsity of the statement.  Therefore, trials end up 
focusing on whether speakers had “sufficient bases” for their 
statements.  This in turn has the effect of chilling the dissemination 
of often naturally ‘imperfect’ claims or evidence of corruption, as the 
speakers can be criminally punished in the event that they cannot 
prove the truth of those claims. 
For instance, a prominent congressman Roh Hwe-chan was 
found guilty52 for simply disclosing the names of the prosecutors who 
were named in an illegally wiretapped conversation between high-
level Samsung Group officials planning bribery payments to the 
prosecutors because he could not prove whether the prosecutors 
actually took the bribes.  Roh was later found not guilty only at the 
appeals court.  Seungji Ha and Won Sun Choi note: 
There is no evidence presented to confirm the falsity 
of statement in this court ruling, therefore it is unsure 
whether the court examined any evidence on . . . 
determining the veracity of the statement. Even if the 
prosecutor had [somehow] successfully proven that 
the defaming statements were in fact false, it is 
necessary for the court to state the evidence it based 
its ruling on.53 
Significantly, the court decision focused on whether 
Congressman Roh had reasonable bases for his statement—an 
                                                                                                                    
 52  
In this incident, the defendant deduced that Samsung gave money to Ahn 
through illegally recorded materials and articles from the press. The 
illegally recorded conversation only implies list of names of the 
prosecutors who “planned” to receive the money, but the defendant went 
further to make a false statement by claiming that the prosecutors on the 
list actually “received” money from Samsung. Since the articles from 
the press and recorded materials all contain information achieved from 
illegal recording, there is no way to prove the authenticity of Roh’s 
claim . . . .[T]hough the defendant himself tried to investigate whether 
the prosecutors actually received money from Samsung, we shall 
conclude that the defendant was fully aware of making false statements. 
 
Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2007Go-Dan2378, Feb. 9, 2009 (S. Kor.), rev’d, 
Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.] 2009No520, Dec. 4, 2009 (S. Kor.).  
 53 Seungji Ha & Won Sun Choi, Burden of Proving Falsity in False Defamation Cases, 
6 KOREA U. L. REV. 31, 36 (2009) (alteration in original). 
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impossible demand when Roh was simply engaging in neutral 
reportage on the wiretapped conversation and was merely calling for 
an investigation into the matter.  Even more significantly, the court 
ruled against Roh without making a finding that the prosecutors did 
not receive the bribes.  In a similar case,54 a citizen was sentenced to 
seven months of imprisonment for revealing that a prosecutor had 
engaged in illegal dealings with organized criminals to purchase an 
expensive property at a low price.  Again, the court, without much 
evidentiary analysis, simply ruled that Prosecutor Lee did not 
committed such offenses.55 
3. Insult Prosecutions 
The crime of insult is also vigorously prosecuted in Korea 
with 9,417 prosecutions in 2013 and 4,860 prosecutions in 2010,56 
against the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s 2011 General Comment 
34, which warned against punishing “statements not subject to 
verification,” namely expressions of feelings and opinions.57  Korea 
is not the only such country.  However, in Germany, the world’s 
capital of insult prosecution, 58  insult is processed as private 
prosecution (Privateklage)59 where prosecutors are not involved and 
therefore free of political bias.  In Japan, the crime is treated lightly 
like a civil infraction, involving a maximum fine of 10,000 JPY.60 
Insult law has been also used by government officials to crack 
down on the people who shared negative feelings and opinions 
against the police.  In 2013, out of 9,417 indictments for the crime of 
insult, 1,038 of them (a little more than 10%) were for insulting the 
police officers. That percentage has only grown as the number of 
                                                                                                                    
 54 Seoul District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2007GoDan3122, Apr. 24, 2008 (S. Kor.). 
 55 Id. 
 56 2014 KEOMCHAL YEONGAM [2014 PROSECUTORS’ OFFICE YEAR BOOK] 684–689 
(2015), http://www.spo.go.kr/spo/info/issue/spo_history02.jsp?mode=view&board_no=64
&article_no=590945 [http://perma.cc/A49Q-B2U4]. 
 57 U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 37. 
 58 International Press Institute, supra note 21. 
 59 Section 374 of German Code of Criminal Procedure makes a Privatklage available, 
without any requirement of a prior involvement of public prosecution first, in cases involving: 
(1) trespass into the home, (2) insult, (3) bodily harm, (4) threats, (5) corruptibility or actual 
corruption in commercial affairs, (6) damage to goods, (7) unfair competition, and (8) a 
variety of matters of infringement of intellectual property.  STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] 
[CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 374(1), translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html#p2148 [http://perma.cc/D8VH-6A2F]. 
 60 KEIHŌ, supra note 20, art. 15, 231.  
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indictments for insulting the public officials increased to 1,397 in 
2014, which represents a 35% increase from the previous year. 61  
These “police insult” cases have been used to suppress participants 
of demonstrations and assemblies concerning government policies. 
This law has not been vigorously used by the Korean 
government for the specific purpose of suppressing criticism of the 
government.  The reason is that insult is a crime that requires a formal 
accusation to be filed with the police by the insulted.  The socially 
established, who are the likely victims of the insult, have been 
deterred from filing such formal accusations for fear that such filing 
may trigger negative publicity.  However, the presence of insult law 
has justified the existence of “candidate insult” law, which practically 
bans the constituency from criticizing candidates in emotional tones 
or sharing emotional views of candidates with fellow constituents. 
4. Conclusion 
The crime of insult, criminal defamation, and “truth 
defamation” laws are vigorously enforced by Korean authorities, 
despite the warnings of international human rights bodies, including 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee that condemned penalizing an act 
of making truthful statements as well as using incarceration as a 
punishment for defamation in General Comment No. 34 issued in 
2011. 62   The Committee specifically recommended in 2015 that 
Korea’s law be amended.63 
                                                                                                                    
 61 Press Release, MP Park Nam-chun, Jaknyeon Haru 4-Myeong Kkollo Kyeongch’al 
Moyokjoe Ch’eop’eolbad-a . . . 1-nyŏn Se 35% Chŭngga [Last Year, Four Persons Per Day 
Were Punished for Insulting Public Officials . . . Increased by 35% in One Year], Mar. 26, 
2015, http://bit.ly/1FR5YG1 [http://perma.cc/6LCW-RCRD]. 
 62 U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 37. 
 63 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Rep. 
of the Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/KOR/CO/4 (Dec. 3, 2015), http://tbinternet.
ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fKOR%
2fCO%2f4&Lang=en [http://perma.cc/Q6G4-NLCS]. 
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III. CANDIDATE DEFAMATION AND INSULT LAW AND 
PRACTICE 
1. Candidate Defamation Law and Practice 
Korea’s election law provides a pervasive system of 
restrictions on the time and manner of election campaigning.64  These 
restrictions were justified in the name of fairness between richer and 
poorer candidates, but the originated under the authoritarian Rhee 
Syngman regime in the late 1950s and mimicked the Japanese legal 
system.65  A subsequent justification for maintaining this legislation 
was to reduce opportunities for corruption and vote-buying.  The 
efforts of the Central Election Commission (CEC), which enforces 
all regulations on election campaigns, and prosecutors are generally 
credited with reducing vote-buying.  Post-election surveys show that 
the percentage of voters who admitted receiving cash, gifts, free 
dining, entertainment, or tours before the National Assembly 
elections has fallen from double digit percentages in the 1990s to 3% 
in 2004 to 1.4% in 2008.66  
The Public Official Election Act (POEA) is designed to 
temporally circumscribe election campaigns in Korea.67 Article 93 of 
the POEA prohibits individuals from distributing or posting 
advertisements, letters of greetings, posters, or other printed matter, 
“or the like,” supporting or opposing a political party or candidate for 
a period of 180 days before the election to the election day.68  The 
statute also generally prohibits any campaign activities before a short, 
fourteen-day legal campaign period prior to the National Assembly 
and local elections and a twenty-three day period prior to presidential 
elections.69 The sole exceptions are for very limited activities, such 
as the distribution of name cards, which is allowed from 120 days 
before National Assembly elections. 70  Moreover, punishment for 
                                                                                                                    
 64 Haggard & You, supra note 15, at 171. 
 65 Song Seog-Yun, Seon’geo Undong Kyucheippeop eui Yeon weon: 1925-nyeon Ilpon 
Pot’ongseon’geopeop eui Seongrip kwa Han’guk Puntanch’eche eui Yuip [The Origin of the 
Regulatory Election Campaign Law: Japanese 1925 Election Law and Its Importation into 
the Division System of Korea], 46 SEOUL L.J., no. 4, 28, 44–53 (2005). 
 66 JONG-SUNG YOU, DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITY, AND CORRUPTION: KOREA, TAIWAN, 
AND THE PHILIPPINES COMPARED 112 (2015). 
 67 Public Official Election Act, supra note 9. 
 68 Id. art. 93. 
 69 Id. art. 33, 59. 
 70 Id. art. 60–63. 
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derogations is harsh: individuals and civil society organizations 
violating these provisions are subject to imprisonment of up to two 
years or fines of up to four million won.71 
These restrictions on campaigns produce enormous 
incumbent advantage because challengers are unable to effectively 
promote themselves before the legal campaign period.  Moreover, 
there is a troubling trend of incumbents using the advantages of office 
to aggressively prosecute opposition candidates, both for the 
prohibition on campaigning in the pre-campaign period and on claims 
of false election speeches and slander, which work like candidate 
defamation and candidate insult, respectively. 
The latter set of violations are of particular concern because 
of the discretion granted to prosecutors in defining what constitutes 
false election speech and slander—even negative campaigns based on 
correct information of a candidates’ positions have been deemed 
slanderous.  As with the punishments under the defamation laws 
described in the previous section, the consequences for illegal 
campaign speech are grave.  The Public Official Election Act 
stipulates that anyone who publishes false facts about a candidate and 
his or her family for the purpose of defeating the candidate in the 
election is punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years or a fine 
between five million won and thirty million won.72  However, even 
publication of correct information about a candidate that is deemed 
slanderous could be punishable by imprisonment of up to three years 
or a fine of up to five million won, although a violator could be 
immune from punishment if the publication of the true facts is 
subsequently deemed in the public interest.73 
The discretion exercised by prosecutors on when to bring 
cases presents a risk of politicization of the prosecutorial process.  
Chung Bong-ju, a former National Assembly member and one of 
South Korea’s most popular political commentators, was imprisoned 
for a full year in late 2011 after being convicted of spreading rumors 
about Lee Myung-bak’s connection to an alleged stock fraud during 
the 2007 presidential election.74  The Supreme Court’s ruling for 
Chung was criticized by legal scholars as well as opposition parties, 
human rights groups, and other civil society organizations, for 
                                                                                                                    
 71 Id. art. 254(2), 255(2). 
 72 Id. art. 250(2). 
 73 Id. art. 251. 
 74 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 5, at 467–68. 
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discarding the application of the “actual malice” standard and shifting 
the burden of proof of falsity of the statements from the prosecution 
to the defendant.75  Although Park Geun-hye raised the same issue of 
Lee’s possible connection to the stock fraud scandal during the 
campaign for the presidential nomination of the Grand National Party 
in 2007, the prosecutors did not investigate her case, indicating 
prosecutorial bias.76 
After the inauguration of Park Geun-hye as president in 
February 2013, a number of people who criticized her as a 
presidential candidate, her late father and former president Park 
Chung-hee, or her brother Park Ji-man were investigated, detained, 
fined, and indicted for false statements even when there was 
reasonable evidence that the claims being made were true.  Kim Eo-
jun, editor of the online newspaper Ddanzi Ilbo, and Ju Jin-woo were 
indicted for raising suspicion about Park Geun-hye’s brother Park Ji-
man’s involvement in the murder of their nephew in their popular 
podcast Naggomsu (“I’m a Petty Trickster”) in June 2013.77  Park 
Jeong-gyu was accused by the Election Commission, investigated, 
and indicted for posting an article by a Korean-American journalist 
that exposed the late president Park Chung-hee’s coercive 
recruitment of sex partners based on an interview with a victim who 
subsequently immigrated to the United States. 78   Baek Eun-jong, 
editor of the Voice of Seoul, was arrested and indicted for posting an 
article on a rumor about Park Geun-hye’s illegitimate child.79 
                                                                                                                    
 75 Cho Kuk, Ilpu Heowi ka P’ohamdoen Kongcheok Inmul Pip’an eui Peopcheok 
Ch’aekim [Legal Responsibility for Partially False Criticism of a Public Figure], 53 SEOUL 
L.J., no. 3, 2012, at 175; Kim Jong-cheol, Kongchikseon’geopeop Che-250-cho Che-2-hang 
(Nakseonmokcheok Heowisasil Gongp’yojoe) wa Kwallyeonhan Daepeopweon P’ankyeol e 
taehan Heonpeopcheok Keomt’o [A Constitutional Review of the Supreme Court Decision 
on the Article 250-2 of the Public Official Election Act (False Campaign Speech to Defeat 
an Opponent], 22 YONSEI L. REV., no. 1, 2012, at 1. 
 76 Haggard & You, supra note 15, at 172. 
 77 Kim Dong-ho, ‘Naggomsu’ Kim Eo-jun-Joo Jin-woo Pulgusok Kiso [‘Naggomsu’ 
Joo Jin-woo and Kim Eo-jun Indicted Without Detention], YONHAP NEWS (June 13, 2013), 
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2013/06/13/0200000000AKR2013061317
9300004.HTML?input=1179m [https://perma.cc/7FMR-D8D3]. 
 78  Yoon Sung-hyo, ‘Pak Cheong-heui eui Yeo’in’ K’alleom, Peopweon eui P’antan 
eun? [A Column on Park Chung-hee’s Sex Partners: What Will Be Court’s Judgment?], 
OHMYNEWS (July 16, 2013), http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?
cntn_cd=A0001886362 [http://perma.cc/RQB6-4MUT]. 
 79 Lee Eun-jeong, ‘Pak Chi-man Sal’inch’eonggu euihok’ Podo han Paek Eun-chong, 
Gusokkiso [‘Paek Eun-jong, Indicted and Detained for Reporting the Suspicion of Park Ji-
man’s Involvement in a Murder Case], SEGYE ILBO (May 23, 2013), http://www.segye.com/
content/html/2013/05/23/20130523003354.html [http://perma.cc/8YBU-MHLZ]. 
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This problem was felt even more acutely because the Supreme 
Court, 80  while holding the burden of proof over the prosecutors, 
recently imposed something like a “burden of production” on the 
defendant speaker on the truth/falsity of the statement, for the reason 
that election is “too short for a free market of ideas to operate 
properly.”  Such precedent, of course, does not take into account how 
much “untruths” will distort elections if people do not volunteer 
information about candidates, albeit with insufficient bases.  In that 
case, Chung Bong-ju alleged that another politician Lee Myung-bak 
was involved in stock price manipulation of a company called BBK.81  
Lee Myung-bak later became the President.  Once in power, his 
prosecutors indicted Chung for candidate defamation.  Throughout 
the case, the court did not inquire into the truth of the statement and 
instead examined whether Jung had sufficient basis to say what he 
said.  Jung, who merely wanted to cast doubt over Lee Myung-bak’s 
financial deals, was not prepared to produce a basis that the judge 
now equipped with the benefit of hindsight would find “sufficient.”82 
In comparison, in the United Kingdom, false campaign 
speech about a candidate’s personal (as opposed to political) 
character or conduct remains a criminal offense, punishable by a fine, 
but only the most blatant and serious false statements are likely to 
                                                                                                                    
 80  
Allowing people to cast doubts with insubstantial evidence contradicts 
public interest because, even if such doubt has been cleared, the voters 
will have been misled by the defamatory statements. Casting doubts on 
the candidates’ corruptions should not be allowed without any limitation 
even if it aims at checking the candidate’s qualifications for public 
offices. Such doubt-casting should be allowed only when there is a 
substantial reason to believe that the doubts may be true. However, if the 
doubts were based on substantial reasons, one cannot be punished even 
if the doubts are later proved to be false. 
 
Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2001Do6138, Feb. 20, 2003 (S.Kor.). 
 81 Chico Harlan, In S. Korea, a Shrinking Space for Speech, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-s-korea-a-shrinking-space-
for-speech/2011/12/21/gIQAmAHgBP_story.html [http://perma.cc/EFB8-VCUU]. 
 82 Cho Guk, Ilbu Heowiga Pohamdoen Gongjeok Inmul Bipaneui Beopcheok Chaegim 
[Legal Responsibility for Partially False Criticism of a Public Figure], 53 SEOUL L.J., Sept. 
2012, at 175; Kim Jong-cheol, Gongjikseongeobeop Je-250-jo Je-2-hang (Nakseonmokjeok 
Heowisasil Gongpyojoe) wa Gwanlyeonhan Daebeopwon Pangyeol-e daehan 
Heonbeopjeok Geomto [A Constitutional Review of the Supreme Court Decision on the 
Article 250-2 of the Public Official Election Act (False Campaign Speech to Defeat an 
Opponent)], 22 YONSEI L. REV., 2012, at 1. 
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face prosecution.83  The May 2010 elections resulted in thirty-seven 
allegations of making false statements about a candidate.  Of these, 
only one case resulted in a conviction.84  In relation to the June 2009 
local and European elections, there were only four alleged cases and 
none of them resulted in further action.85  For further comparison, 
Australia repealed its provision about false campaign speech as 
criminal offense in 2007, following doubts about the law’s 
practicability and consistency with freedom of speech.86 
2. Comparison to Japan and Taiwan 
The number of people investigated or indicted for candidate 
defamation and candidate insult (represented in the table below as 
“false propaganda”) in Korea is overwhelming compared to Taiwan 
and Japan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
 83 Jacob Rowbottom, Lies, Manipulation and Elections: Controlling False Campaign 
Statements, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 507, n.10 (2012). 
 84 ASS’NS OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS AND ELECTORAL COMMISSION ANALYSIS, 
ANALYSIS OF CASES OF ALLEGED ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE IN 2010 26 (Feb. 2011). 
 85 ASS’NS OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS AND ELECTORAL COMMISSION ANALYSIS, 
ANALYSIS OF ALLEGATIONS OF ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE AT THE JUNE 2009 ELECTIONS (Jan. 
14, 2010).  See also Rowbottom, supra note 83, n.10 (examining regulation of false 
statements during campaigns). 
 86 Anne Twomey, Freedom of Political Communication and Its Constitutional Limits 
on Electoral Laws, in ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY: AUSTRALIAN PROSPECTS 189 (Joo-Cheong 
Tham, et al. eds., 2011). 
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Table 1. Number and Types of Election Law Prosecutions in Korea87 
 
 
 
Taiwan’s campaign regulation is focused not on restricting 
political speech but on preventing vote buying.  The table below 
indicates that enforcement is concentrated on prosecuting vote 
buying cases: about 94% of prosecutions for election-related crimes 
represented vote buying.  Recall that vote buying cases represented 
only 30–40% of total investigations, and candidate defamation/insult 
steadfastly increased to a recent high of 25.7% in South Korea.88  
There are no cases of illegal propaganda and relatively few cases of 
false propaganda in Taiwan.  The standards for prosecution of false 
campaign speech seem to impose a higher burden of proof to 
prosecutors in Taiwan than in South Korea.  In Taiwan, the judiciary 
has established “actual malice” standards for criminal defamation, 
including defamation of candidates, which requires the prosecutors to 
prove both the falsity of the statements and that the defendant made 
a false statement knowingly or with reckless disregard.89  Hence, the 
potential for political abuse of prosecuting false campaign speech is 
lesser in Taiwan than in South Korea. 
                                                                                                                    
 87 Haggard and You, supra note 15 (summarizing data from various press releases from 
Korea’s Supreme Prosecution Office). 
 88 See Table 1. 
 89 Jimmy Chiashin Hsu, Free Speech and Democratic Consolidation in a Divided Polity: 
Taiwan's Politics of Rumors and Laws of Defamation, 2000–2008 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished 
J.D. dissertation, University of Chicago), http://search.proquest.com/openview/42fa5ef6
33cf6f5ca42125fdd6c0be4b/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y [https://perma.cc/
8PCX-NAYQ]. 
15th	(1996) 16th	(2000) 17th	(2004) 18th	(2008) 19th	(2012) Total
Investigated 1,995 3,749 3,797 1,990 2,544 14,075
(Indicted) (713) (1,552) (2,829) (1,283) (1,448) (7,825)
(Detained) (175) (139) (423) (68) (115) (920)
Money,	gift 667 1,548 1,609 575 828 5,227
(33.4%) (41.3%) (42.4%) (28.9%) (32.5%) (37.1%)
"Black"	propaganda 287 502 564 400 655 2,408
(14.4%) (13.4%) (14.9%) (20.1%) (25.7%) (17.1%)
Illegal	propaganda 90 666 470 272 121 1,619
(4.5%) (17.8%) (12.4%) (13.7%) (4.8%) (11.5%)
Violence 279 208 105 58 77 727
(14.0%) (5.5%) (2.8%) (2.9%) (3.0%) (5.2%)
Others 672 825 1,049 669 863 4,078
(33.7%) (22.0%) (27.6%) (33.6%) (33.9%) (29.0%)
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Table 2.  Number and Types of Election Law Prosecutions in Taiwan 
(Lower Court) 
 
 
 
Note: The percentages (last column) denote the proportion of each type of election-
related crime out of total election-related crimes of which the type is known, for 
the period of 2003-2012. 
 
Source: ROC Court statistics, provided by Dr. Bi-ling Kuan (管碧玲), member of 
the Legislative Yuan.  
 
The table below presents a comparison of the numbers and 
percentages of investigated persons during legislative elections from 
1996 to 2012 in Korea and Japan (lower house elections), categorized 
by the type of election crime.  Note that the total number of 
investigated people for election crimes during this period is much 
larger in Korea (14,075) than in Japan (5,169).  Considering that the 
number of House Representatives in Japan (475) is larger than that of 
the National Assembly members in Korea (300) and that Japan’s 
population (127.3 million in 2013) is much larger that Korea’s (50.2 
million in 2013), this shows that prosecution of election crimes is 
much more rigorous in Korea.  A more striking difference is the 
relative proportions of vote buying versus administrative offenses: 
while vote buying represents 82% of election crime investigations in 
Japan, the equivalent figure in Korea is only 30–40%.  The proportion 
of people investigated for administrative offences in Japan is just 11%, 
but the equivalent figure in Korea is as high as 40.5%.  Another 
difference is seen in the proportion of prosecution of candidate 
defamation (and candidate insult in Korea): 0.1% in Japan but 17.1% 
in Korea. 
 
 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total (%)*
Money, gift 592 85 335 1,471 522 327 164 996 984 184 5,660 93.8%
False propaganda 32 64 23 24 16 38 23 220 3.6%
Violence 13 10 7 6 1 37 0.6%
Others 4 112 1 1 118 2.0%
Unknown 284 40 72 15 20 2 433 -
Total 876 125 407 1,531 620 464 188 1,020 1,029 208 6,468 100%
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Table 3.  Numbers and Types of Election Law Prosecutions in Korea 
and Japan 1996–201290 
 
  Japan Korea 
Investigated 5,169 14,075 
(Detained) (991) (920) 
Vote buying 4,236 5,227 
  82.0% 37.1% 
Infringement of freedom 375 727 
(interference, violence,---) 7.3% 5.2% 
False campaign speech 5 2,408 
(candidate defamation/insult in Korea) 0.1% 17.1% 
Illegal campaign & others 553 5,697 
(administrative offences) 11% 40.5% 
 
Note: Japan’s statistics are for six general elections from the 41st (1996) to 46th 
(2012) House of Representatives.  Korea’s statistics are for five general elections 
from the 15th (1996) to 19th (2012) National Assembly.  Infringement on electoral 
freedom in Japan includes interference in voting, illegal voting, violence, etc.  
Infringement on electoral freedom in Korea denotes violence only.  False campaign 
speech in Korea includes slander of candidate based on true facts, which is however 
used by prosecutors and courts as “candidate insult.”  “Others” in Korea may 
include some violations that are classified as “infringement of electoral freedom” 
in Japan. 
3. Candidate Insult Law 
As explained earlier, candidate insult law is the prosecutors’ 
and courts’ adaptation of a provision in election law that punishes 
statement of facts designed to undermine a candidate’s campaign.  On 
its face, it reads like a truth defamation provision.  If it were really 
treated as such, it likely would be the world’s only legislation banning 
statements of facts in election periods when all statements of truth 
about candidates should be deemed to be in the public interest.  
Probably, due to the courts’ reluctance to let that happen, the 
provision is being used as candidate insult law. 
Recently, there was one exceptional case where the 
prosecutor tried to use candidate insult law as truth defamation of a 
candidate.  A prominent poet was found guilty of this provision for 
                                                                                                                    
 90 Jong-song You, The Politics of Electoral Campaign Regulation in South Korea and 
Japan: Similar but Different?, (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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alleging that the then Presidential candidate Park Geun-Hye had 
custody of calligraphy by Ah Joong-geun, an independence fighter 
who assassinated Ito Hirobumi, the Japanese prince who spearheaded 
the annexation of Chosun. 91   Although the judgment was later 
reversed on the grounds that, where falsity has not been proven, the 
poet had the public interest in mind in making the claims, 92  the 
demonstrated legal risk cast a chilling shadow on anyone who may 
reveal inconvenient truths. 
At any rate, most of the prosecutions under this provision 
involve epithets against candidates.  They are indicted and tried like 
“candidate insult” law, and they account for about half of the false 
speech cases in Korea. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF CANDIDATE DEFAMATION AND INSULT 
1. Research Method 
This Article attempts to identify if there is evidence that 
prosecutors’ decisions to indict were influenced by the consideration 
of protecting the ruling party candidates. We propose three different 
methods of testing this hypothesis.  All 850 candidate defamation 
court cases and 719 candidate insult court cases decided during the 
twenty-year period from 1995–2015 were obtained for analysis. 
Firstly, we compare the number of prosecutions initiated for 
protecting the ruling party candidates compared to the opposition 
candidates.  Korean prosecutors can indict sua sponte or upon receipt 
of criminal complaints filed. 93   Therefore, the difference in the 
numbers can depend on other factors, such as people’s willingness to 
file criminal complaints on election-related statements or people’s 
greater willingness to make critical comments on the ruling party 
candidates in a more vocal and risky fashion, which we cannot control.  
However, assuming that these attitudinal factors are not significant, 
                                                                                                                    
 91 Nam Hyun-woo, Poet Ahn Found Partially Guilty, KOREA TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), 
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/11/116_145842.html [http://perma.
cc/6NCE-96AV]. 
 92 An To-hyeon Si’in, Kongchikseon’geopeop Wiban 2 simseo ‘Mujoe’ [Poet An To- 
hyŏn, ‘Not Guilty’ on 2 Counts of Violation of Public Official Election Act], YONHAP NEWS 
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2014/03/25/0505000000AKR2014
0325076451055.HTML [http://perma.cc/VZN6-A4LN]. 
 93 Hyeongbeop [Criminal Procedure Act], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, amended by 
Act. No. 14179, May 29, 2016, art. 257 (S. Kor.) 
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this study provides a rough outlook on prosecutorial practice, though 
falsifiable upon proof the aforesaid factors. 
Secondly, we can use the judgments issued on the indictments 
as a measure of rectitude of the indictments.  The assumption here is 
that the courts are independent and can evaluate the substance of the 
indictments efficiently.  If the frequency of “not guilty” judgments is 
higher for the indictments protecting the ruling party candidates 
compared to opposition candidates, it is a sign that the former group 
of indictments was the result of prosecutorial willingness to indict the 
statements attacking the ruling party candidates. 
Thirdly, we can look at how the prosecutors respond to the 
cases presented to them through criminal complaints, requests for 
investigation, etc.  There is no public record of criminal complaints 
or requests for investigations, filed by private individuals, but a 
record of the same exists as filed by the Central Election Commission.  
If the prosecutors were more likely to indict the statements attacking 
the ruling party, that can be evidence of prosecutorial bias.  This 
Article concludes that all three methods showed prosecutorial bias. 
2. Frequency of Pro-Ruling-Party Prosecutions 
To take an example from the latest presidential elections in 
2012, the number of indictments initiated upon statements attacking 
the ruling party candidates outnumber the ones attacking the 
opposition candidates by wide margins (i.e., 87% vs. 13%). 
 
Table 4.  Number of All Candidate Defamation/Insult Cases in the 
2012 Presidential Election 
 
 Slander False Total (Proportion) 
Ruling Party 
Candidate 
84 69 153 86.4% 
Ruling Party 
(Primary) 
1 0 1 0.6% 
Opposition 
Candidates 
13 10 23 13.0% 
Total 98 79 177 100.0% 
 
 
Note: appellate levels are counted separately. 
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The table below shows that the proportion of ruling party 
candidate-involved trial cases changed from 76.5% in 2002 to 14.5% 
in 2007 to 87% in 2012 presidential election.  The 2007 presidential 
election number initially appears to be exceptional at 14.5%.  
However, it should be kept in mind that indictment decisions are 
usually made after the election, and in 2007, the ruling party changed 
when the opposition candidate Lee Myung-bak won the election 
converting all the non-ruling party candidates into the “ruling” 
category.  Therefore, the 2007 numbers are eminently consistent with 
this Article’s postulate about prosecutorial bias.  Thus, we can infer 
that the prosecution always showed political bias in favor of the 
president elect. 
 
Table 5.  Number of Trials and Convictions for Presidential Elections, 
by Attacked Candidate’s Party Affiliation  
 
    Ruling  Non-Ruling Total (Ruling ratio) 
2002 Trial cases 13 4 17 76.5% 
  Convictions 7 4 11 63.6% 
  (Conviction rate) 53.9% 100% 64.7%   
2007 Trial cases 39 230 269 14.5% 
  Convictions 33 200 233 14.2% 
  (Conviction rate) 84.6% 87.0% 86.6%   
2012 Trial cases 154 23 177 87.0% 
  Convictions 102 15 117 87.2% 
  (Conviction rate) 66.2% 65.2% 66.1%   
 
Note: Saenuri (GNP) was an opposition in the 2002 and 2007 presidential election, 
but a ruling party in the 2012 election. Saenuri candidates won the 2007 and 2012 
elections. 
3. Rate of Not-Guilty in Pro-Ruling-Party Prosecutions vs. 
Pro-Opposition Prosecutions 
The dependent variable, “Not Guilty,” takes a value of one if 
the court ruling is either “not guilty” or “suspended sentence.”  This 
Article treats suspended sentence as practically equivalent to a “not 
guilty” sentence because most criminal defendants and attorneys treat 
it that way. Our logit regression analysis identifies if and how much 
the probability of a “Not Guilty” ruling is influenced by various 
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independent variables.  Our choice of independent variables is limited 
by the data.  We do not and cannot include the characteristics the 
defendants, except for hiring of private lawyers (“Private”).  The 
copies of court sentences we obtained do not allow identification of 
the defendants by categories such as their party affiliation and 
demographic variables, except for occupations that are not 
standardized and hence not useful for statistical analysis.  Fortunately, 
for most cases, we can identify the candidates who were attacked by 
the defendants associated with “true but slanderous expressions” or 
“release of false factual information” about the candidates.  By 
including the characteristics of the candidates who were attacked 
such as their party affiliation (“Ruling party” and the major 
conservative “Saenuri” party, or its antecedent, the Grand National 
Party), incumbency at the time of attack (“Incumbent”), and success 
or failure at the subsequent election (“Elected”), we can examine 
whether those defendants who attacked the ruling party candidates, 
incumbent candidates, and elected candidates are more or less likely 
to get “Not Guilty” sentences than those who attacked opposition or 
independent candidates, non-incumbent candidates, and unsuccessful 
candidates. 
The table below shows the results of logistic regressions for 
the entire sample (column 1), the non-presidential sample (column 2); 
and the presidential sample (the cases in which the attacked 
candidates were presidential candidates) (column 3).  Note that the 
average probability of receiving a “Not Guilty” sentence is 21.9% for 
the cases of defamation via false information (“Defamation”) and 
23.2% for the cases of slander via true information (“Insult”).  We’ve 
included the variable “Defamation” to see if there is a systemic 
difference in the probability of “Not Guilty” between these different 
types of candidate defamation, but the coefficients for “Defamation” 
are insignificant in all three columns. 
In columns 1 (entire sample) and 2 (non-presidential sample), 
the coefficients for “Ruling party” are positive and highly significant 
(at 0.1% level for the entire sample and at 1% level for the non-
presidential sample).  This means that the defendants who attacked 
ruling party candidates are significantly more likely to receive “Not 
Guilty” sentences than those who attacked opposition or independent 
candidates.  It is hard to imagine that Korean courts favor opposition 
and independent candidates over ruling party candidates; instead, the 
significantly positive coefficients for “Ruling party” are perhaps due 
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to the fact that these indictments are due to prosecutorial bias.  When 
prosecutors have too vigorously indicted anyone who attacked ruling 
party candidates (including rather minor offenses), the court’s 
unbiased decisions, or less biased decisions, will make the 
coefficients positive. Interestingly, the coefficients for “Saenuri” (or 
GNP) are negative, although they are statistically not significant.  
When we consider combined effects of “Ruling party” and “Saenuri,” 
the probability of “Not Guilty” increases more for those who have 
attacked non-Saenuri ruling party candidates than those who have 
attacked Saenuri candidates when the party was in power. 
Note that the conservative Saenuri (and its antecedent GNP) 
has been the ruling party before February 1998, and again since 
February 2008 under presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and 
Park Geun-hye (2013–present).  The major liberal parties were in 
power under presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-
hyun (2003–2008).  Korean presidents have a five-year single term 
limit, and their term begins and ends in late February. 
On the other hand, the coefficients for “Elected” are negative 
and significant (at 5% level for the entire sample and at 0.1% level 
for the non-presidential sample).   The defendants are less likely to 
get “Not Guilty” sentences when the candidates they had attacked 
have been elected than when the attacked candidates have not been 
elected.  The significantly negative effect of “Elected” probably 
reflects a court bias in favor of protecting the powerful.  Note that the 
coefficients for “Incumbent” are very small and insignificant. Thus, 
what matters is not whether the attacked candidate was an incumbent 
at the time of the attack but whether the attacked candidate wins the 
subsequent election.  In other words, the effect of incumbency status 
of the attacked candidates differs depending on the time: incumbency 
status prior to the contested election (and prior to court trials) has no 
effect, but incumbency status post-election (at the time of court trials) 
has a significant effect on court rulings. 
Considering the effects of the four variables—”Ruling party,” 
“Saenuri,” “Incumbent,” and “Elected”—together, the probability of 
a “Not Guilty” ruling is greatest when the attacked candidate was a 
non-Saenuri ruling party candidate (i.e., the Democratic or Woori 
candidate between February 1998 and February 2008) who lost the 
election.  That probability is the lowest when the attacked candidate 
was a Saenuri (or GNP) candidate between February 1998 and 
February 2008 who won the election, followed those who attacked a 
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Saenuri (or GNP) candidate after February 2008, who won the 
election. 
However, the effects of these variables differ somewhat when 
we look at the presidential sample.  “Ruling party” is not significant, 
but the “Saenuri” effect is large and negative (significant at 1% level) 
and the effect of “Elected” is large and positive (significant at 5% 
level).  This different pattern for the cases of attacking presidential 
candidates can be understood, by considering the large number of 
cases in the 2007 presidential election.  During the election, GNP was 
the main opposition party, but then-president Roh Moo-hyun was a 
lame duck.  In fact, there were much higher numbers of indictments 
for those who attacked the opposition candidates Park Geun-hye who 
lost the GNP nomination (thirty-two “slander” cases plus eighteen 
“false” cases) and Lee Myung-bak, who were eventually successful 
in the election (138 “slander” cases and forty-two “false” cases) than 
for those who attacked the ruling party candidates, such as Chung 
Dong-young (nineteen “slander” cases plus two “false” cases). Note 
that this kind of change in ruling party after the election did not take 
place for elections other than the presidential election. 
Also, the negative effect of “Saenuri” and positive effect of 
“Elected” are negated for Saenuri candidates who have been elected, 
such as Lee Myung-bak in the 2007 presidential election and Park 
Geun-hye in the 2012 presidential election.  Considering the effects 
of the three variables—”Ruling party,” “Saenuri,” and “Elected”—
together, the probability of a “Not Guilty” ruling is the greatest when 
the attacked candidate was a non-Saenuri party candidate who won 
the election, which practically means Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 
presidential election.  Indeed, of the thirteen cases that involved 
slander of candidate Roh Moo-hyun, six cases, or 46%, got “Not 
Guilty” rulings, a significantly higher rate than the average “Not 
Guilty” probability of 23% for the slander cases.  Note that 
“Incumbent” is not included in the logit regression for the presidential 
sample because there can be no incumbent candidates in presidential 
elections in Korea due to the single-term limit. 
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Table 6.  Logit Regression Results for Entire, Non, Presidential, and 
Presidential Samples 
 
 Entire sample  Non-presidential  Presidential 
Court 0.2554 *  0.0457   0.6057 ** 
 (0.1114)   (0.1339)   (0.2016)  
Private 0.2244   0.4190 *  -0.0688  
 (0.1570)   (0.2033)   (0.3078)  
         
E_LEVEL 0.2087 *  0.2200     
 (0.1062)   (0.1829)     
E_YEAR -0.0332   -0.0666 ***  0.2052 ** 
 (0.0188)   (0.0204)   (0.0659)  
Ruling party 0.8038 ***  0.6554 **  -0.1697  
 (0.1569)   (0.2117)   (0.3810)  
Saenuri -0.2179   -0.1229   -2.1143 ** 
 (0.1693)   (0.2134)   (0.8079)  
Incumbent -0.0579   -0.0250     
 (0.1618) (0.1736)    
Elected -0.3088 *  -0.5950 *** 1.9569 * 
 (0.1493)   (0.1808)  (0.8817)  
FALSE -0.0332   -0.0220  0.0396  
 (0.1581)   (0.1875)  (0.2987)  
Constant 64.388   131.861 *** -414.061 ** 
 (37.829)   (41.088)  (132.343)  
N 1215   892  323  
Log 
pseudolikelihood        
-
619.76379   
-
438.30238  
-
162.86688  
Pseudo R2 0.0407     0.0539     0.1047   
 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. 
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 
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4. Prosecutors’ Treatment of Cases Referred by Central 
Election Commission 
Table 7.  Rate of Indictment on Cases Referred by Central Election 
Commission in 2012 Presidential Election 
 
 
Cases 
Referred Rate Indictment 
No 
Indictment 
Rate of 
Indictment 
Ruling Party 15 55.6% 9 6 60.0% 
Opposition 1 8 29.6% 3 5 37.5% 
Opposition 2 4 14.8% 3 1 75.0% 
Opposition 
Total 12 44.4% 6 6 50.0% 
 27 100% 15 12 55.6% 
 
As shown in the table above, prosecutors were 10% more 
likely to indict statements attacking the ruling party candidate than 
the statements attacking the opposition candidates. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This empirical study confirms that prosecutors are likely to 
use their indictment power in favor of ruling party candidates than 
opposition candidates in prosecuting candidate defamation cases and 
candidate insult cases.  Extrapolating the candidate defamation/ insult 
cases to general defamation/insult cases, the results show that South 
Korea has reason to mull over whether to adopt the international 
standard of abolishing or effectively retiring criminal defamation and 
insult laws. 
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